INTRODUCTION
Food subsidies in the Arab Republic of Egypt are as old as the nation's pyramids. Over the many upheavals and spells of stability, Egypt's policy makers have persistently prioritized food subsidies in an effort to achieve social equity and political stability. In the past century, Egypt's food subsidy system (FSS) has evolved from emergency food relief to a core social safety net program, 1 and its importance is reflected in the significant amount of public resources allocated to food subsidies.
The contemporary system (tamween) includes two components: baladi bread (BB) and ration cards (RCs). Spending on these two programs ranged from a peak of 13 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the mid-1960s to a low of 0.9 percent of GDP in the late 1990s, averaging 1.7 percent of GDP in the past five years. Subsidies have become embedded as a citizen's right, and legitimacy of the ruling regime has been conditioned on its commitment and ability to provide food and basic goods at affordable subsidized prices.
This chapter reviews the historical development of Egypt's FSS and highlights major reforms and innovations that are being implemented today. The chapter builds on a large literature and offers additional information and data, mostly previously unpublished, from official sources-namely, the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MOSIT) 2 and the General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC). In addition, it uses media reports and a beneficiary survey to fill in some knowledge gaps on the perspectives of beneficiaries.
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A large literature on the traditional pitfalls of the FSS has pointed out the well-known challenges regarding leakages, the regressive nature of benefits, and various cost inefficiencies. Attempts to reform the system have always been politically sensitive in Egypt. Indeed, discussions on targeting, for example, contrast with the notion that Egypt's social contract is largely considered an entitlement for the majority of middle-class Egyptians, especially during crises and economic downturns.
However, food subsidies came under renewed scrutiny in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution, especially starting in mid-2014. A significant reform was rolled out, consolidating the two components of Egypt's FSS. The most important measures were replacing subsidized commodity quotas with a monthly cash allotment, allowing RC beneficiaries to choose among a larger number of items, shifting from input-to output-based subsidies, capping the number of loaves per person, and establishing a point-based incentive system that allows beneficiaries to use savings from BB consumption to buy commodities under the RC system. This last step on a long path of reforms, including several failed attempts, fits into a broader global trajectory of food-based social assistance systems. As discussed in chapter 1 of this volume, Egypt's FSS evolved from the provision of specific goods in-kind (subsidized at different stages of their production and distribution) in dedicated shops to an open voucher-style subsidy. At the same time, modern technology changed the accountability and oversight of subsidy provision, realizing significant efficiency gains. The system has achieved much greater "personalization" and traceability of all subsidized food commodities, yet it remains essentially universal, refraining, at least for the moment, from using the technology for more decisive targeting.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. After placing food subsidies within the context of Egypt's broader social safety net system, it documents the historical evolution of food subsidies, highlighting major reforms and modifications, discusses the innovations of the new system, and sets out the main challenges. A final section draws emerging lessons and conclusions. Annex 3A lays out core milestones of the individual components since their inception. Annex 3B presents the results of a beneficiary survey conducted in 2016. Commodity subsidies comprise six items: (a) subsidies for tamween commodities (food); (b) farmers' subsidies; (c) fuel subsidies; (d) electricity subsidies; (e) subsidies for medicine and children's milk; and (f) transfers to public water companies. Food subsidies have been the cornerstone of Egypt's social safety net, especially when Egypt became significantly vulnerable to global food price shocks and currency exchange rate fluctuations. This vulnerability was translated into the amounts allocated to food subsidies in the fiscal budget, with food subsidies averaging about 24 percent of total commodity subsidies and 1.7 percent of GDP in the past five years. The FSS program is the second-largest program in Egypt's social safety net system in terms of public spending (figure 3.2). Fuel subsidies have remained the largest (2.2 percent of GDP), in spite of a significant drop (from 6.3 percent of GDP in fiscal year 2014/15) caused by the decline in fuel oil prices.
Egypt's social protection programs are not only highly fragmented, but also unbalanced. Social assistance cash transfers from the Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS), the only program that targets just the poor, were still small, accounting for less than 5 percent of the subsidies, grants, and social benefits segment of the budget and constituting only 0.26 percent of GDP, on average, during the past five years (table 3.1). The expenditure on MOSS was small, despite the considerable increase in the size of benefits and coverage of the program, especially after two new programs, Takaful (Solidarity) conditional cash transfers and Karama (Integrity) unconditional cash transfers were launched in January 2015. 4 An estimated 9 percent of Egyptians would have fallen into poverty in the absence of food subsidies in fiscal year 2008/09 (Al-Shawarby and 
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El-Laithy 2010). In fiscal year 2010/11, although food subsidies accounted for only 4 percent of total household expenditures on food consumption, 5 they represented 22.5 percent of the total calorie consumption of the whole population (32.5 percent for the poor; 20.8 percent for the nonpoor) (WFP 2013) and still had a very large impact on poverty. Figure 3 .3 shows the effect of food subsidies on the Egyptian poverty rate in fiscal year 2010/11. Egypt's 2011 and 2013 revolutions came with a new social contract and pressing demands for more inclusive growth and social justice. The policies have emphasized inclusive growth with several important developments: the 2014 constitution, which focused on the social agenda; the strategic Egypt Vision 2030, which stressed social justice; the coordination of social policies through the ministerial Social Justice Committee; and the 2014 subsidy reform measures. 6 For all social safety net programs, the government adopted a phased approach of improving targeting, efficiency, and delivery before expanding either coverage or benefits. The intention was to shift gradually from universal subsidies to subsidies targeted toward the poor and vulnerable and to improve the quality of social services provided.
In July 2014, the government embarked on a major social and economic reform program and introduced a series of reforms with the objective of fiscal consolidation and protection of the poor. The introduction of comprehensive price increases for fossil fuels and electricity saved LE 51 billion, of which LE 27 billion (US$3.6 billion) 7 was allocated for reforms in health, education, and social safety nets. Concurrently, MOSIT implemented FSS structural reforms. Parallel to those reforms, MOSS established a tool for targeting the poor (a proxy means test), with the goal of having the two new cash transfer programs-Takaful and Karama-reach 2.1 million households by June 2017. Also, the Social Fund for Development implemented a labor-intensive public works program (supported by the World Bank and the European Union) in the poorest governorates to target the low-skilled unemployed poor. Moving toward modern delivery systems, the Ministry of Planning, Monitoring, and Administrative Reform (MOPMAR) launched an initiative to build a national database for the poor and to integrate social safety net programs and coordinate targeting and delivery mechanisms.
The post-2013 political economy was an enabling factor and a critical element for the successful introduction of these reforms. The 2011 and 2013 revolutions, along with their negative economic consequences, psychologically prepared Egyptians for tough government decisions to fix structural distortions and boost inclusive growth.
Challenges with Baladi Bread and Ration Cards until 2014
Before discussing the evolution of the FSS in Egypt and the current outlook, this section summarizes the main challenges affecting the two core schemes: baladi bread and ration cards.
For BB, a key challenge was related to "leakage," meaning the share of benefits not reaching the intended beneficiaries. Leakage occurred in two ways: first, during procurement of domestic wheat, the weak monitoring capacity and underdeveloped supply chain created an incentive for wheat leakage through what are called revolving barns, or shawna dawwarah. Once domestic wheat was bought by the government committee and warehoused, it was discharged and procured by another committee and stored in another shawna, and so on. As a result, government accounted and paid for the same domestic wheat more than once. The exact size of leakage caused by revolving barns is not known, but some estimates put it at 15-20 percent of domestic wheat. Between 2009 and 2015, Egypt procured a total of 58 million tons of wheat, of which 6.5 million tons (11.2 percent) was not milled. 8 A second area prone to leakage was input-based financing, whereby the government's provision of subsidized wheat flour to bakeries opened the door for a black market for flour. For instance, a metric ton of BB flour was sold on the market at LE 1,750-LE 2,000, whereas a metric ton of subsidized BB flour was sold for LE 160. An average bakery used to lose (due to low profit margins and high operating costs) around LE 100-LE 150 for each metric ton of wheat used to produce bread, compared with a profit of LE 1,100 for wheat sold on the black market (Perry and Youssef 2013) . The incentive for leakage was worsened by the weak monitoring capacity of MOSIT and the underdeveloped manual controls along the supply chain. Accordingly, an estimated 30 percent of subsidized wheat flour (for BB or for home baking) was lost to leakage in 2009, according to the HIECS (Al-Shawarby and El-Laithy 2010). MOSIT estimates the loss even higher: 40-50 percent of wheat flour was lost to leakage given the tendency of bakeries to produce underweighted BB (less than 130 grams per loaf).
Such practices dramatically reduced the amount and quality of baladi bread produced. The wheat leakage resulted in bread shortages and pushed down the national average consumption of BB below its already low level of 2.5-2.7 loaves per day. Long queues, violent protests, significant wasted time, and soaring public dissatisfaction were hallmarks of the system. MOSIT specified a wheat quota for each bakery and set a specific number of working hours for each bakery in an attempt to minimize leakage. However, the change did not alter the behavior of bakeries, which reacted by slowing their pace of production and further reducing the quality of bread.
Another key challenge involved wastage at both the supply and demand sides of the BB system. Supply-side problems occurred during the storage and warehousing of domestic wheat in open shawnas, which lost an estimated 10 percent of wheat to rodents, birds, and weather-related damage. The Egyptian Holding Company for Silos and Storage (EHCSS), which was established in 2002 with the mandate of building and renovating the silos (which are used mainly for imported wheat), did not focus much attention on improving the shawnas (EHCSS 2016) .
Wastage on the demand side included consumers' lack of incentives to rationalize or even stabilize their consumption of bread. The subsidized bread system failed to sustain perhaps the most effective tool that could have justified it from the public health perspective-fortification (box 3.1). On the supply side, domestic wheat farmers saved significant amounts of their own production for daily baking and consumption-instead of selling it to the government (to avoid poor-quality bread and long queues).
Similar to BB, the RC system was prone to inefficiencies. Some ration card warehouses and groceries used to leak large amounts of oil and sugar to the black market, where they made a profit from the price difference. Warehouses and groceries had no incentive to sell the subsidized commodity quota to end consumers (RC holders). Also, the increasing cost of the government's imported oil subsidy created an incentive to procure low-quality oil and compromise the standards of the refining and bottling process. This decline in quality created dissatisfaction among consumers, particularly the lower middle class.
The design of ration cards also created obstacles for the poor. An average family of four was required to pay LE 40 up-front to the grocery to receive the monthly quota of food commodities, which created a financial barrier. In 2010, based on HIECS fiscal year 2008/09 data, an estimated 27 percent of the poor did not benefit from the RC system, and about 75 percent thought that the selling prices of subsidized commodities were too high.
Finally, the basket of subsidized commodities in the old RC system was characterized by calorie-dense foods. 10 
LOOKING BACK: THE EVOLUTION OF THE FSS IN EGYPT
Since the mid-1940s, when the first food subsidy program was initiated, Egypt's FSS has experienced changes in design and implementation. Those changes have progressed through five distinct phases: (a) the birth of the system (1941-55), (b) the socialist orientation during the Nasser era , The fortification program showed some good results, despite questions about local capacity to monitor and ensure the quality of flour at the mills. Anemia rates fell nationally, and ownership of the program by MOSIT and the Ministry of Public Health and Population raised public awareness about the nutritional benefits of a good diet. MOSIT's capacity to manage the program improved, and the program continued until 2012, when funding was discontinued.
(c) the liberalization and hobbled reforms during the Sadat era , (d) the successful quiet reforms that dissipated with time during the Mubarak era , and (e) the transformational reform of the system in postrevolutionary Egypt (2011-present) .
Seeds of Egypt's FSS, 1941-55
Food subsidies were first introduced after World War I , when the government began to import large quantities of wheat and flour from Australia and to sell those products in government outlets at discounted prices (Ahmed and others 2001) . The objective was to mitigate increases in international food commodity prices (Scobie 1981) . During World War II, in response to high inflation and food shortages, the government introduced a ration-type subsidy to mitigate the negative impacts of the war on prices and on the availability of necessities. The objective was to ensure that a minimum level of the population's basic needs would be met as well as to reduce the cost of living for the Egyptian masses. Therefore, subsidies were originally universal and had no specifically targeted objective. Subsidized goods included, at the beginning, kerosene and textiles. Shortly thereafter, subsidies were expanded to include sugar, cooking oil, tea, and margarine.
Egypt maintained those controls even after the war ended. There was no significant fiscal burden during the decade following the war, although no official data are available about the magnitude of food subsidies. One study indicates that food subsidies totaled LE 1 million in 1941 and did not exceed a few million until the end of 1950s (Hashish 1980) . 11 The small subsidy bill resulted from three main features of this period: low inflation rates, lower rates of growth of domestic consumption than of GDP, and high food selfsufficiency rates.
Nasser Era: Socialist Orientation, 1956-70 Until the mid-1960s, the main objective of the FSS continued to be to ensure social equity at a time of domestic shortfalls. As the leader of a nationalist and socialist revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser set out to redistribute income and opportunities. Control of food marketing and prices was an important element in this plan (Baker 1978) . Building on the long history of food price control in Egypt, Nasser adapted the framework of food subsidy provision, tightening the government's control over wheat prices and marketing as well as other rationed goods. The FSS was an allocative measure for social equity purposes in a centrally planned economy. To tighten its control on the food distribution system, the government established many public companies for retailing and importing.
The FSS also sought to finance industrialization by providing inexpensive food to urban consumers and ensuring a low cost of living and thereby low wages (Farrar 2000; Sachs 2012 ). Vocal constituencies, mainly urban, thus became a central element in the political context of food subsidies.
Having this key role in the implicit social contract, FSS assumed symbolic significance, instilling support for the regime by providing a "diffuse symbolic fulfillment of a social contract" (Hopkins 1988, 108) , but also meant that any change in subsidies would call into question other elements of the social contract.
The limited available data indicate that FSS represented only 0.4 percent of GDP in 1960 (LE 9 million) and in 1970 (LE 11 million) ( figure 3.4) .
12 Yet the level of food subsidies increased in this period for several reasons: (a) expansion of food price controls, partly in response to Nasser's socialist ideology; (b) increase in consumption that resulted from population growth and an increase in households' disposable income, especially after agrarian reforms; and (c) availability of cheap wheat from the United States under U.S. Public Law (P.L.) 480, 13 which lasted only until 1967, when U.S. foreign assistance was suspended.
14 Sadat Era: Economic Liberalization, Riots, and Hobbled Reforms, 1970-81 Anwar Sadat came to power in 1970 with a heritage of economic difficulties indicating that Egypt's aims had greatly exceeded its means. Within the philosophy of a centralized economy, the government set up a welfare state with guaranteed employment, free access to education and health care, and extensive price administration and subsidies.
Sadat reversed the economic and political orientation of his predecessor and moved closer to the West, hoping to attract private investment, particularly foreign investment. This goal became a key element in a series of 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 113 43 33 Food subsidies (left axis) Food subsidies/GDP (right axis) economic reforms that took the name of infitah (open-door) economic policy. The infitah era was also characterized by a reduction in state intervention in the economy, marking a dramatic shift from the import substitution policy and self-sufficiency promoted under Nasser (Abdel-Khalek 1981) .
Tackling the expanding FSS was one of the main strategic changes taking place in the 1970s. As in other countries covered in this volume (notably, India), food subsidies increased steadily in Egypt throughout 1970-75, from less than 0.4 to 8 percent of GDP, and fluctuated afterward around an average of 5 percent of GDP. This increase was due primarily to skyrocketing world food prices, which more than quadrupled from US$60 per ton in 1970 to nearly US$250 per ton in 1973. The cost of maintaining a stable domestic price for basic commodities resulted in ballooning GASC trading losses in 1973 (from US$28 million in 1972 to US$228 million in 1973) (Ikram 2006) . Food security became a major policy issue, with Egypt becoming a net importer of several agricultural commodities, most importantly wheat.
The objective of the FSS became to insulate Egyptian consumers from inflation caused by high international prices. As such, the FSS became a major economic burden: by 1977, the cost of the 18 subsidized food commodities available on a monthly basis to all RC holders increased significantly. In 1976 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) put forward some requirements for economic reforms, centering on the budget deficit and making lower subsidies the main condition for passing a program (Ikram 2006) .
In January 1977, a subsidy reform plan was announced, shortly after a focused cabinet reshuffle brought more reform-minded players into place (Feiler 2003) . Subsidy reduction measures included both food and nonfood subsidies. The regulated prices of French bread, sugar, and rice were increased, and the tea subsidy was canceled. 15 The prices of BB and shami bread, as well as beans, cooking oil, and rationed sugar, were left untouched (Alderman 1986) .
The public responded immediately with extreme opposition, even though the government kept the prices of most essential commodities unchanged. Riots and strikes spread in major cities. The government's legitimacy seemed to be at stake, and decrees mandating the subsidy cuts were eventually canceled on January 20, 1977. Efforts to contain the unrest during those few days cost the country 73 dead, around 800 injured, and 1,270 arrested. The government reportedly considered introducing a food voucher, but dismissed this idea after the assassination of Sadat. 16 Since then, successive Egyptian governments have fallen captive to the conviction that food subsidy reforms put the country's social peace and political stability at risk. As a result, the subsidy bill rose from 4.1 percent of GDP in 1977 to 7.8 percent in 1979. Drawing on the events of early 1977, a more conservative and incremental approach to reform was adopted-focusing on "easier" subsidies and price controls and establishing wage adjustments in the public sector as compensation. Although such reforms ignored workers in the informal sector who are especially vulnerable to commodity price increases, the nexus of subsidies and public wages continued to characterize Egypt's food subsidy reforms in the following decades. Specifically, two types of reforms were adopted. The first type limited eligibility for subsidies by introducing lower-valued RCs for relatively better-off beneficiaries and freezing the registration of newcomers (children born after 1988), with the aim being to move gradually to a better targeted food subsidy program. The second type made cautious cost-saving changes in 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 the provision of food subsidies, such as reducing the number and weight of subsidized rationed food items, changing the weight and ingredients of BB, and incrementally raising prices. Both types of quiet reforms largely avoided social disruption similar to that of 1977. This success can also be attributed to the association of food subsidy reforms with annual wage and salary increases and to some political repression (Sachs 2012) . The downward trend in the FSS fiscal burden reversed in the 2000s, mainly because of the depreciation of the Egyptian pound. Those drops resulted in a dramatic increase in inflation rates-from about 3 percent in 2000-02 to 11.3 percent in 2004. This trend coincided with a decline in local wheat production and a sharp rise in the international prices of imported consumer commodities (including cost of freight). To mitigate the negative inflationary impact and contain public discontent about rapidly soaring prices, the government expanded the food subsidy program, increasing the number of types and quantities of items as well as the number of covered beneficiaries.
Mubarak Era
In spite of the increases in the 2000s, FSS costs never reached the alarming levels seen under Sadat, averaging 1.4 percent of GDP in that decade. In those years, about 96 percent of the poor were benefiting from the FSS, but those in the richest quintile were receiving about 12.6 percent more from food subsidies than those in the poorest quintile (Al-Shawarby and El-Laithy 2010). The BB and cooking oil subsidies were the most regressive of all food subsidies. The only subsidized food that was progressive was baladi wheat flour, which provided the poorest quintile as much as 5.8 times the benefits as the richest.
CURRENT SIGNS OF A TRANSFORMATION

Baladi Bread
Besides its political objectives, the January 2011 revolution demanded better living standards and equity. Nonetheless, Egypt's weak economic performance had a negative effect on the government's ability to finance the subsidy bill, which hovered around 8 percent of GDP during fiscal years 2011/12 to 2013/14, with the food subsidy bill accounting for 25 percent of total government expenditure.
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During the first two years after the 2011 revolution, the MOSIT continued to take the traditional approach to addressing the daily problems of providing wheat flour to bakeries and preventing long queues of BB consumers, including the use of military forces for baking bread. However, starting in 2013, Egypt attempted to curb government spending on food subsidies and to reduce wastage by improving the efficiency of the FSS. The plan was to improve the control measures that were in place to manage and monitor the supply chain and eliminate intermediaries from various parts of the chain as well as to ration BB consumption through a smartcard system. The plan was commended, but stakeholders within the FSS resisted these reforms, and bakery owners threatened a nationwide bakers' strike if the government did not back down (Kamal 2015) .
In February 2014, MOSIT introduced several radical changes to the structure of the BB system, carefully preparing and planning the steps of reforms and using evidence and new opportunities offered by technological advances. The reforms were motivated by and responded to high expectations following the 2011 and 2013 revolutions.
In an effort to improve the supply chain of the BB system and to enhance the system's effectiveness, in 2013 the government introduced a pilot system for BB in Port Said City (box 3.2). On the basis of the lessons learned from that pilot, the new system was modified and rolled out nationwide in fiscal year 2014/15. The new system had the following features and design parameters: (a) shifting from an input-based subsidy to an output-based subsidy, (b) capping the benefit size and consolidating the system, (c) automating the system and supporting financial inclusion, and (d) reducing wheat waste and cutting storage leakage.
Shifting from an Input-Based to an Output-Based Subsidy
The new system shifted toward output-based financing; that is, the wheat flour that is being distributed to bakeries is no longer subsidized. Instead, bakeries get the wheat flour from mills at the market price and sell BB loaves to consumers at agreed-upon prices (5 piastres). MOSIT then subsidizes the difference between the real cost (which includes the bakeries' marginal profit) and the selling price. The actual price of a BB loaf is determined on the basis of the price of wheat and the price of wheat flour. This new pricing system interrupted leakage of wheat flour to the black market, curtailed the long queues at the bakeries, and encouraged bakeries to meet certain quality standards to increase their sales and thus their profits.
In the new system, an average bakery can make a profit of LE 800-LE 1,000 per metric ton of BB loaves sold. Bakeries have turned into market competitors that have an incentive to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. Previous attempts by bakeries to reduce the weight of a bread loaf (which must be 110 grams in the new system) have declined dramatically because consumers can choose to go to any bakery in search of better-quality BB loaves. In fact, the number of reported violations by bakeries in regard to underweight loaves and loaf specifications decreased from prereform rates of 37,339 and 45,598 incidents, respectively, to 11,860 and 14,102 incidents, respectively, in 2015. Under the new system, bakeries are neither limited to any quota of wheat flour nor tied to a specific number of working hours.
Making bread available for citizens at any time of the day had a very positive social impact: it dramatically reduced queuing times for the majority of beneficiaries, who cited the new system as a tangible government reform
BOX 3.2 Port Said Baladi Bread Pilot
In November 2012, the government launched its program for subsidy reform and improved targeting in several national programs. In January 2013, MOSIT began to pilot the use of smartcards to distribute bread in Port Said, installing point-of-sale (POS) readers in each bakery. The pilot's objective was to improve the supply chain and to monitor the actual consumption of each family so that the government could cap the size of benefit.
Port Said was chosen because of its small population, its well-defined boundaries, its low dependency on bread compared with other governorates (which meant less criticism in case of failure), and its having the lowest number of bakeries per capita nationwide. That is, if it was able to tackle the queuing issue in Port Said, the system could be replicated throughout the country.
After one year, MOSIT hailed the pilot as a success and rolled it out nationwide, with a few modifications, such as the capped benefit size. The system was consolidated through a point system in April 2014 as a radical move toward a system-based approach. during the Port Said pilot, MOSIT also moved from an input-based to an output-based subsidy, liberalizing the wheat flour sold to bakeries to cut leakage and minimize trading on the black market. The communication strategy behind that move, however, was strongly criticized for not being inclusive.
since the 2011 revolution (annex 3B). The availability of quality bread is thought to have encouraged Egyptian farmers to sell a higher percentage of their wheat production to the government, taking into consideration the higher government procurement price of domestic versus imported wheat.
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In fiscal year 2014/15, the share of domestic wheat procured by the government reportedly surpassed the share of imported wheat for the first time, reflecting the influence of the government strategy.
Automating the System and Supporting Financial Inclusion and Transparency
MOSIT would not have been able to modify the FSS without an automated smart system to monitor both the bakeries' financial transactions and the beneficiaries' daily consumption of BB and accrued savings points. The ministry built on the smartcard system that was developed in 2006 to monitor consumption under the RC system. Linking the BB and RC systems was relatively easy for private companies, which were able to consolidate the system, print bread cards, and roll out the model nationwide within 8-13 months, starting in Port Said (box 3.3).
Automating the system meant that all bakeries had to have POS readers to sell their goods to cardholders. To retrieve their daily bread quota, cardholders enter a personal identification number in the POS reader. All of the financial transactions between MOSIT and bakeries are now automated, and the amount of bread produced and sold is known. Moreover, the system prompted all bakeries to open a bank account for the financial settlement of sold bread.
BOX 3.3 Family Smartcard System
In 2006, as part of its efforts to integrate the social programs and consolidate the social safety net system, the Egyptian government developed and introduced a family smartcard system for food ration cards. All groceries contracting with MOSIT were equipped with POS readers, and each beneficiary household received a smartcard.
despite some pitfalls, the system represents a successful example of a privatepublic partnership. The family smartcard team at MOPMAR, contracted with the private sector to develop and maintain the system, and the government plays a stewardship and financial role. Private companies invest in the hardware and software of the program and claim their profits through card use and transactions. They have a strong incentive to keep the system running smoothly to ensure the flow of their revenues. According to MOPMAR, any system bugs or POS errors are fixed within one or two hours at any governorate branch.
The system has some challenges, however. Some fake cards have been printed, and the POS machines have been manipulated to accept fake cards or to report fake transactions. MOSIT and the family smartcard team at MOPMAR are exploring options to digitize the system better and to unify the coding in a way that minimizes any possible leakages or fraud.
More than 25,000 bakeries are now financially included in the banking system and paying taxes according to their sales.
Capping the Benefit Size and Consolidating the System
The current reform seeks not only to address supply-side issues, but also to change consumer behavior and build a new social contract. MOSIT, under the new system, set a maximum of 5 BB loaves per individual per day or 10 kilograms of subsidized flour per individual per month in 13 governorates, mostly in Upper Egypt. 19 This level was based on the country's highest per capita consumption of bread (4.5 loaves in North Sinai) and was guided by the pilot in Port Said. The state's bread subsidy stands at around 30 piastres per loaf, which means a monthly subsidy of LE 45 per individual. To change consumer behavior, MOSIT introduced a system for rewarding the rationing of BB or subsidized flour (for private baking). The point-based system rewards every loaf saved with 10 piastres, which consumers can use to purchase commodities under the RC system. That is, for each loaf of bread saved, the government saves 20 piastres and the consumer gets 10 piastres, in addition to the 5 piastres saved by not buying a loaf of bread. By consolidating the BB system with the RC system, the government, for the first time in the history of the FSS, introduced an opportunity cost for bread consumption. The new system turned Egypt's subsidy beneficiaries into market consumers, who can maximize their benefits according to their needs and preferences.
The new system, which provides good-quality and readily available bread, attracts more beneficiaries. According to World Food Programme estimates and the Ministry of Finance's fiscal year 2016/17 budget assumptions, the number of beneficiaries of the BB system grew from 56.0 million in 2013 to 82.2 million in 2016 (WFP 2013) . Without the new point system and at the same coverage of 82.2 million people, the BB subsidy alone would cost the government about LE 40 billion annually. By rationing the consumption of bread, the point system led to an estimated annual savings to the state of about LE 11 billion. In addition, the national annual procurement of wheat dropped below the levels of fiscal year 2013/14. The consolidation of the BB and RC programs allowed beneficiaries more choice with regard to their dietary priorities.
Analysis of the savings of the BB point system by governorate suggests questions for further assessment. The highest bread savings per household come from urban governorates, whereas the lowest savings are concentrated in governorates in Upper Egypt with the highest poverty rates and a majority rural population ( figure 3.7) . This result could be explained by differences in the regions' make-up of meals-BB is a major element in almost all meals in rural Upper Egypt-and reliance on subsidized flour for baking. However, the consumption of subsidized flour for home baking has dropped in the 13 governorates where this scheme is allowed (both in percentage and quantity). That is, the reliance on BB in these governorates has increased. 
Reducing Waste and Storage Leakage
In order to reform the BB supply chain even more, a national project to upgrade storage of local wheat was launched in 2014. About 30-40 percent of the open-land barns (shawna torabiya), which are estimated to have wasted 11 percent of domestic wheat, have been or are being upgraded to concrete or asphalt construction with proper ventilation and storage capacity. About 50-60 additional silos are being built across the country to increase the government's storage capacity and reduce the dependency on the shawnas. In addition, a smart tracking system is being developed to monitor the storage of wheat at silos and shawnas, minimizing any double counting (revolving shawnas).
Ration Card
The RC system sustained a paradigm shift after the issuance of Ministerial Decree 215 for 2014. Now, each RC household receives a monthly cash allotment of LE 15 per person, with no limit on the number of beneficiaries per family. This amount was decided on the basis of the nominal cost of RC subsidies per capita in fiscal year 2013/14. The new system has four main differences from the old one (detailed in table 3.2). First, the system offers consumer choice and a wider variety of food commodities. The list of commodities available under the RC system started with 20 items and has gradually expanded to about 100 items, covering foods (including chicken, meat, fish, and dairy products) and nonfood products (for example, detergents). Many of these commodities come in more than one package size and include different brands. The RC beneficiary can now purchase any quantity of any of the items available in any grocery at any time throughout the month, up to the amount of the benefit. The quality of the basket of commodities is equal to the quality available in the private market, because the government is no longer subsidizing any particular commodity. Second, the system encourages a more diversified diet through a wider variety of commodities, which has potentially positive nutritional effects. The new system may reduce-although not fully remove-the considerable economic incentives for the consumption of calorie-dense foods (bread, cooking oil, sugar, and rice). This change has been supported by consolidation of the BB and RC systems and the use of points-based incentives for forgoing BB. GASC data for 2016 shows an increase of 30 percent in dietary diversity under the new points model. Third, the new system has increased market competition and stimulated commercial activities by allowing retail groceries, which used to sell only the three subsidized commodities, to sell as many commodities as they want in addition to the RC commodities. Groceries have become more efficient through economies of scale. In addition, MOSIT launched a new chaincalled Game'yeti (My Cooperative)-with a target of 14,000 retail shops across Egypt by 2018. This franchising model enables young owners to get concessional loans to equip and stock their shops with commodities according to the specifications and price policies of MOSIT. The market-based policy has led to higher sales in Egypt's three state-owned grocery chains-Al-Ahram, Alexandria, and Nile. The three chains had total annual sales of LE 1.5 billion in 2015, compared with LE 0.8 billion in 2014 and LE 0.7 billion in 2013.
Fourth, the system has a simpler supply chain that gives MOSIT and its affiliated agencies more negotiation power in the commodity market. The Holding Company for Food Industries (HCFI), which has been under MOSIT since 2014, is authorized to manage tenders to get the needed quantities of various RC commodities. As the largest buyer in the market, with LE 1.5 billion every month, HCFI can negotiate with suppliers, leading to wholesale prices that are at least comparable with what mega retailers can obtain. This influence enables HCFI to give a large discount to grocers licensed to receive RC commodities (up to 15 percent), helping to make their business profitable.
CHALLENGES OF THE NEW FOOD SUBSIDY SYSTEM
The new FSS continues to face challenges, including shortages of some basic commodities, continued distortions in the market, poor targeting, and lack of adequacy (smaller subsidies-that is, fewer basic commoditiesper beneficiary). At the current stage, the main focus of the reform efforts is to tighten up the targeting of beneficiaries, starting with cleaning the lists from duplicates and fake IDs, as noted in box 3.3. There is a continuing challenge of ensuring adequacy of benefits, both in terms of value and availability.
Over the first half of 2016, cooking oil and rice were reported to be unavailable in MOSIT-affiliated groceries. The shortages created significant dissatisfaction, particularly among persons dependent on the food subsidy: "What is the use of money in the new system if we cannot find what we need?" asked a beneficiary interviewed in a television media report. According to GASC data, the shortage of oil was equal to more than one-third of the total supply between July and December 2015, compared with the same period in 2014. The shortage of rice, however, was caused by MOSIT's late procurement of rice in relation to the planting season. The shortage led to a more than 67 percent reduction in supply and a near doubling in price. As a quick mitigating measure, MOSIT had to subsidize rice in the supply chain and import large quantities of rice to counterbalance the high prices.
Since 2014, MOSIT has set two prices for the same commodities, a lower one for the RC allowance and an upper one for the points credit. That is, beneficiaries buy 1 kilogram of rice at LE 4.5 using the LE 15 monthly allowance and 1 kilogram of rice at LE 6 using their credit from the points system. At the beginning, the difference between the two prices for all essential commodities (rice, sugar, and oil) was not enough to create any market distortions. But given the acute shortage of rice and oil, the difference became larger, and beneficiaries began to sell their quotas on the black market. MOSIT's reasons for adopting differential pricing for basic commodities are not yet clear.
Although the new system provides higher-quality products (bread and commodities) and wider consumer choice, the amount of subsidy itself is lower than it was under the old system. In 2014-16, food price inflation reduced benefits by 18 percent compared with the old system.
A survey among a random sample of beneficiaries across locations was conducted for this study in May 2016. 20 The survey was meant to measure the perceptions of beneficiaries regarding the new FSS as a whole and to compare specific aspects such as food quality, availability, and adequacy. The majority of respondents (72 percent) said that they had no difficulty obtaining a smartcard, while 25 percent had difficulties. Almost all respondents stated that the new BB system is better than the old one. For example, 91 percent claimed that the quality of the bread is better; 96.4 percent reported that the new BB system provides adequate amounts and weight of bread; 99 percent stated that BB is available most of the time; and 84 percent said they receive BB with waits of less than 15 minutes. Similar results are seen across regions and income quintiles.
Regarding the RC system, respondents reported that they mainly consume five commodities in the new system: packed sugar (99.4 percent of respondents), oil (96.2 percent), packed rice (62.6 percent), packed macaroni (33.5 percent), and tea (22.2 percent). Satisfaction with the new RC system is not as strong, with mixed results by region and income quintile. In general, 59 percent of respondents said that they favor the new RC system and the diversity of the commodities it offers over the old one. Respondents in Lower Egypt seem to prefer the new RC system more than those in Upper Egypt (67 and 55 percent, respectively) or in metropolitan governorates (47 percent). In addition, the majority of respondents from the sample's poorest quintile said they favor the old RC system (52.2 percent) and that the old system's diversity was adequate (54.9 percent).
The majority of respondents said that the main commodities such as oil, rice, sugar, macaroni, and tea are of excellent quality. This finding reflects the market competition created among public and private sector suppliers.
With respect to availability, most of the desired RC commodities were reported to be available most of the time, except for rice and oil. 21 When asked about the size of subsidy and whether it is adequate, about 53 percent of beneficiaries said that it is less adequate than it was under the old system (61.1 percent among the poorest quintile), and 40 percent thought it is the same. Furthermore, 83.0 and 84.3 percent of beneficiaries in Upper Egypt stated that the amount of oil and rice, respectively, is smaller in the new system.
The overall survey findings suggest a promising transformation in the Egyptian FSS. In the BB system, the results provide strong positive signals for quality, adequacy, availability, and waiting times. The results for the RC system indicate positive signals for quality and diversity, but mixed signals for adequacy and availability. Among beneficiaries from the poorest two quintiles, the quantity or adequacy of food commodities appears to be more important than their quality or diversity.
Beyond the FSS, perhaps the most important message for government policy makers is the striking percentage (86 percent) of respondents who reported having moderate to severe difficulty fulfilling their food needs in the past three to six months. When asked what they see as the best mitigating or compensating measure, increasing the smartcard food subsidy came first (43 percent of respondents), followed by supporting cash transfers for poor families (40 percent).
Transforming the food subsidy into a voucher-like system provided the country with a tool to adjust the size of subsidy to offset inflation or to cushion price shocks. Starting from June 1, 2016, MOSIT increased the allowance per beneficiary by 20 percent, from LE 15 to LE 18 per family member per month. In May 2017, following another spike in prices, the government increased the allocation to RC again to LE 35. The preliminary findings of the 2015 HIECS show that the FSS favors families living in rural areas with regard to coverage and the poor with regard to share of household food consumption. The new FSS is protecting about 4.2 million Egyptians from falling into poverty.
Total FSS coverage of the population was 88.6 percent in 2015. Coverage was 95.4 percent in rural areas and 80.5 percent in urban areas. The new food subsidy accounts for 6.8 percent of total household food consumption, but it accounts for 10.5 percent for the lowest decile and 4.2 percent for the richest decile. In addition, total household consumption of sugar, oil, and rice represents 73. 5, 73.6, and 23.4 percent, respectively (CAPMAS, various years) .
Nevertheless, the universality of the new food subsidy has allowed a substantial degree of regressivity, as evidenced by the fact that 77.4 percent of the richest decile and around 90 percent of the second-through fourth-richest deciles are benefiting from the system.
LESSONS LEARNED
Understanding Egypt's recent reforms of its FSS could provide important lessons for countries considering reforms of their own social safety net programs. The government introduced transformational reforms to a large and inefficient subsidy system during a politically sensitive time for the country. Changing the behavior of suppliers and consumers through incentives has had a positive impact on the acceptability of the reform. Several lessons could be drawn from the Egyptian experience:
• Participatory approach and communication strategy. In 2014, the government developed a communication strategy to account for different and often conflicting needs and expectations of stakeholders in the FSS at the central and local levels. MOSIT started by mapping stakeholders with regard to their influence, power, and importance. This step was followed by a review of stakeholders' needs, interests, and expectations, along with the extent of their involvement in the system. A communication plan was developed, with specific sequencing arrangements and customized pitching strategies for each group of stakeholders.
• Sequencing and piloting. Piloting the BB reforms in Port Said helped MOSIT to understand the system's challenges and improve its dynamics. MOSIT kept a day-to-day record of field monitoring of the new system in Port Said and undertook regular surveys of mills, bakeries, and consumers to understand their issues. Building on the positive signals from Port Said, the rollout of the reform was based on a sequencing strategy that moved from urban to rural areas to allow enough time for the system to mature and for private companies to develop the system in rural areas.
• Institutional ownership. Absorbing such a significant reform in a short period, given the complex structure of MOSIT, was not an easy task. Under MOSIT's leadership, a project team, headed by the minister, was formed to conduct a series of customized training sessions and workshops with the various departments and entities of the ministry. This training was key to familiarizing officials with the objectives and features of the consolidated system and to building their sense of ownership. That approach was also part of the institutional communication plan at the central and local levels.
• Data-driven decisions. The new system has a database that enables policy makers to understand consumption trends and preferences by region, beneficiary, age, and other factors. The database gives the ministry precious information, and MOSIT is preparing to automate the system's databases even further (MOPMAR is building a unified national registry for social safety net programs).
Policy makers from other countries could also learn from the history of reforms in Egypt. Political crisis and rapid changes required the use of "out of the box" solutions that modern technology has offered. Similar efforts in India, documented in chapter 2 of this volume, have led to equally impressive gains in efficiency and reduction of leakage. The political economy of reform, when dealt with properly, has also proven to be an enabler of change. The decision to replace compensation mechanisms with predictable, regular subsidies for bakeries earned the support of previous opponents to reform. Egypt made a partial transition to vouchers, offering beneficiaries wider choices and moving in the direction that the United States implemented in full (chapter 6); at the same time, inflation poses risks to the adequacy of transfers, with the experience of Sri Lanka (chapter 4) serving as a cautionary note. Clearly, indexation mechanisms (as opposed to ad hoc adjustments) are required to countervail such risks. Finally, Egypt's government-run distribution system has realized economies of scale in procurement, a factor that remains relevant to Mexico's experience (chapter 5).
The current reforms could be complemented by additional steps, pointing to policy options. From one standpoint, the FSS in Egypt is almost universal: having appropriate targeting mechanisms or differentiating the amount of support depending on need could make the system more progressive, while maintaining social cohesion. Such attempts to target FSS have occurred before, but the new opportunities provided by the ongoing process of data digitalization can make targeting more accurate and inclusive.
Technology to make smartcards even more personalized and secure, such as biometrics, has been applied successfully in some countries and could be considered. Similarly, the current supply chain has been significantly improved at the beneficiary end through the use of technology and output-based financing or a voucher-like system. The other end of the food system supply chain (procurement, warehousing, wheat milling, and distribution) needs to be addressed equally. MOSIT could capitalize on the available smart technology of logistical tracking to monitor every step of the supply chain through the end user. To avoid fluctuations, benefit size could be reviewed regularly. Given the positive results of the 2008-13 national fortification program, MOSIT may consider adopting a sustainable, budgeted national program of fortifying BB using advanced quality assurance and monitoring mechanisms at the central and local levels. Nutrition awareness on the importance of food diversity should be enshrined in the program and prioritized at the national level. Finally, recent shortages of rice and oil in the FSS reemphasized the public demand for continued engagement of the government in stabilizing prices. As in the case of wheat, MOSIT could consider creating a strategic reserve for rice and cooking oil.
Egypt's FSS has evolved from an in-kind subsidy to a voucher-like system. While preliminary signals are encouraging, a robust evaluation using data from the 2016 HIECS would shed more quantitative light on the initial results.
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ANNEX 3A. MILESTONES RELATED TO BALADI BREAD AND RATION CARDS
1941
• Controls are placed on retail prices of wheat flour and bread.
• Allocation of 50% of all agricultural landholdings to wheat production is mandated.
• Consumer prices of all types of bread and flour are subsidized.
n.a. (not  available) 1945-55 • State control over the production and trading of wheat is gradually increased.
n.a.
1955
• The area allocation requirement for wheat production is reduced to 33%.
• A compulsory delivery policy is imposed, with a specific quota of wheat (between 1 and 3 ardeb per feddan) at a fixed price lower than international prices.
1957
• government begins to control flour extraction and bread production.
Early 1960s
• government imposes strong interventions in agricultural production by area allotment and forced deliveries.
• Agricultural cooperatives are created in each village to control production and marketing of major crops, including wheat.
• Transport of wheat without permission from the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade (MOSIT) is prohibited.
• The government gains complete control of bread price and flour extraction rates.
1967
• Public Law (P.L.) 480 program wheat is suspended until 1975.
• Baladi bread (BB) is included in the supply commodities of the MOSIT for the first time, tying BB to tamween subsidy allocations because of the 1967 war.
1970
• The area allocation requirement for wheat production is reduced to 27.5% of all agricultural landholdings.
• government tightens its control on marketing, distribution, and import of wheat.
1975
• The general Company for greater Cairo's Bakeries is established, to be responsible for the production, trade, and distribution of all kinds of bread. 
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1976
• The Principal Bank for development and Agricultural Credit is created to work with cooperatives.
• Compulsory delivery of wheat is replaced by an optional delivery program.
1977
• An unsuccessful attempt is made to increase the price of fino, among other regulated prices, sparking widespread riots.
1983
• The general Organization for Mills, Silos, and Bakeries is established, with 11 companies. • wheat production and marketing are partially liberalized; mandatory area allocations and delivery quotas are abolished; optional delivery at guaranteed floor prices is introduced.
• The weight of BB 87.5% is reduced to 135 grams (from 160 grams), and its price is increased to 1 piastre (from 0.5 piastres).
• A special 82% extraction BB is introduced for 2 piastres with a weight of 160 grams.
• New weights and prices are set for 72% extraction shami bread (big loaves: 137 grams for 2 piastres per loaf; small loaves: 45 grams for 2 piastres per 3 loaves) and for 72% extraction fino bread (big loaves: 140 grams for 2 piastres; small loaves: 69 grams for 1 piastre).
• A mandate is imposed on fino bakeries to use at least 80% of their flour quota in producing fino bread, leaving a maximum of 20% of the quota for the production of sweets and other special types of bread.
• BB with 87.5% extraction flour gradually disappears, and BB with predominantly 82% extraction flour costs 2 piastres.
n.a. 
1988
• BB with 87.5% extraction flour is eliminated.
• Three types of bread are available in the market:
-Regular BB made from 82% extraction, which retails at 2 piastres and weighs 160 grams -Crispy 82% extraction flour bread, which retails at 5 piastres and weighs 135 grams -Soft 72% extraction flour bread, which retails at 5 piastres and weighs 160 grams.
1990
• Regular BB made from 82% extraction retails at 5 piastres and weighs 160 grams.
1990/91
• Subsidy is eliminated on 72% extraction fino flour and bread.
• The private sector is allowed to import, produce, and trade unsubsidized fino flour.
• Fino with 76% extraction flour is eliminated.
1992/93 • All restrictions on marketing fino flour are eliminated.
• Mills are restricted to the production of only one type of flour.
n.a 1993/94 • Shami flour and bread are eliminated from the subsidy system, leaving just 82% extraction BB and flour subsidized.
• Private and public millers producing fino flour are required to use only imported wheat.
1998
• An 80:20 ratio of wheat flour (82% extraction) and corn flour (97% extraction) is introduced in subsidized flour to reduce leakage and wastage.
• The size of 82% BB is reduced to 130 grams (from 135 grams), keeping the price at 5 piastres.
• The size of tabaki 76% extraction is reduced to 110 grams (from 160 grams), and its price is increased to 10 piastres (from 5 piastres).
• Informal bakeries are formalized, and flour quotas are allocated to them. n.a.
2003
• Subsidized fino bread is reintroduced, and bakeries are provided additional quantities of flour to bake fino into refined bread at 10 piastres.
2004
• The number of BB bakeries is increased in populated and deprived areas.
• The bread subsidy is estimated at 10 piastres per loaf.
Cabinet decree 298
2006
• The sale price for flour to bakeries using 82% extraction flour is set at LE 900 per metric ton.
2008
• wheat prices skyrocket following the global food price crisis.
• The military intervenes to alleviate bread shortages.
• BB flour is fortified with iron.
2009
• The decree determines the required specifications for the bakeries producing tabaki bread.
• The weight of a tabaki bread loaf is increased to 140 grams, and its price is increased to 20 piastres. A small tabaki loaf of 80 grams is sold for 10 piastres.
• All bakeries are specified to produce taree (soft) bread with 76% extraction flour, with the following specifications: (a) a loaf for 20 piastres, weight of 150 grams, diameter not less than 22 centimeters, and moisture not more than 36% and (b) a loaf for 10 piastres, weight of 85 grams, diameter not less than 18 centimeters, and moisture not more than 36%. n.a.
2012
• The price of subsidized 80% extraction flour for licensed tabaki bakeries is increased to LE 900 per metric ton, up from LE 110 per metric ton.
2013
• Signs of success are seen following a smartcard-based pilot project of flour and BB distribution in Port Said.
2014
• The BB and ration card programs are newly redesigned and consolidated for the first time in Egyptian history.
10
Note: n.a. = not applicable. 
1941
• Rationing is introduced during world war II, with subsidized basic commodities including kerosene and textiles and, later, sugar, oil, tea, and ghee.
1943
• Ministry of Supply is established. n.a.
1945
• Issuance of a decree that has represented the basis for all ration card (RC) system laws.
• Subsidized items include kerosene, sugar, cooking oil, and tea. 
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1966
• New RCs are issued for Egyptians and foreigners residing in the country for at least one year.
• Having a civil identification card is the only requirement to get an RC, probably just to ensure no duplication in the registry.
• RCs provide a limited number of strictly rationed food items: sugar, cooking oil, and tea, in addition to kerosene, soap, and some cotton textiles that are provided when available. • RC items for foreigners are provided at market prices.
404
1979
• Foreigners are excluded from holding RCs, except for Sudanese and Palestinians.
• Issuance of new RCs is forbidden starting in February, except for those who could not have theirs issued earlier for compelling reasons, and people are penalized for not notifying the government that they are holding more than one card or for traveling abroad for more than six months without temporarily suspending the RC. • The decree abolishes the existing RCs and replaces them with new ones that exclude certain categories of households: those with emigrants, workers abroad for more than six months, workers in international organizations, workers in investment companies (except service assistance workers), landholders (of more than 10 feddans), and persons subject to general revenue tax (except government and public sector employees).
• More subsidized items are covered by RCs: textiles, flour, sugar, chicken, fish, and corn.
• Quotas are reduced.
• Newborn children are added on a regular basis, starting January 7. 
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1983
• Partially subsidized red RCs are introduced and given to specified better-off categories: those mentioned in decree 22 for 1980 and the owners of properties that yield rent higher than LE2,000 per year (the tax exemption threshold), luxury cars (with more than a three-cylinder engine), or two cars; owners of private businesses, professionals who have been members of syndicates for more than 15 years, and workers in embassies or in the Arab League.
• All other Egyptians are eligible for fully subsidized green RCs.
• Sudanese and Palestinians are still eligible for special RCs.
• Modifications are made to the eligibility for red RCs: in addition to the categories mentioned in decree 51 for 1983, owners of luxury cars (with more than a four-cylinder or 2000 cc engine) are eligible.
• The issuance of RCs is eased by allowing the applicants for RCs to declare that the information they have provided in the form is true and correct, so they have no need for certification by another party. • The use of red and green RCs is effective starting October 1, 1984 October 1, . 419 452 1987 • Foreigners residing in the country for more than six months are allowed to apply for special red RCs.
• RC holders do not have the right to get their monthly quota in the following month and risk being excluded from the program if they do not receive their quotas for three consecutive months, unless acceptable justification is provided.
• Eligibility for red RCs receives minor modification. • The number of beneficiaries of RCs declines to 38.5 million Egyptians out of 40 million possible beneficiaries.
1990/91 • Meat is eliminated from RC benefits.
• The number of households holding RCs is 84.7% of the population.
1991/92 • Fish and tea are eliminated from RCs.
• The price of a 300-pack of cooking oil is set at 30 piastres for fully subsidized RCs and 50 piastres for partially subsidized RCs.
• The monthly quota of cooking oil is set at 500 grams per person in cities and urban areas and 300 grams per person in rural areas. • Items (other than sugar and oil) that were of poor quality and not bought by consumers are gradually phased out.
• The benefits received by beneficiaries are estimated at LE 16 per household.
1996
• For the first time, categories eligible for fully subsidized RCs are specified, allowing all other categories to apply for partially subsidized RCs.
• Eligible categories include (a) government and public sector employees and pensioners; (b) recipients of social solidarity and Sadat pensions; (c) seasonal, temporary, agriculture, and irregular workers; (d) widowed and divorced of the previous categories; and (e) others who prove to be deserving.
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152 1997
• 69.2% of the population hold RCs, of which 7.3 percent hold low-subsidy cards.
• The price of domestic sugar is increased to 60 piastres for fully subsidized RCs and to 85 piastres for partially subsidized RCs.
1999
• All subsidized items are eliminated, except for cooking oil and sugar.
• The monthly quota of cooking oil is 500 grams for cities (retailed at 50 piastres for fully subsidized RCs and at 75 piastres for partially subsidized RCs) and 300 grams for villages and markazs (retailed at 30 piastres for fully subsidized RCs and at 50 piastres for partially subsidized RCs).
• green RCs cover 8.37 million households or 36.2 million individuals, and red RCs cover 1.6 million households or 6.8 million individuals, with total coverage of almost 10 million households or 42.4 million individuals.
• The private sector is allowed to produce, distribute, and export food items that are under the RC system. • The price of subsidized cooking oil for a 500-gram pack is set at 50 piastres for fully subsidized RCs and at 75 piastres for partially subsidized RCs.
• The number of beneficiaries is 8.3 million households or 39.6 million Egyptians (56% of the population).
• Of all RC system beneficiaries, 19% carry red RCs.
• Additional items are eliminated because of their poor quality, reducing subsidized items to sugar, oil, and rice.
• RC subsidies are distributed by 36,000 tamween grocery stores.
• The total subsidy of LE 15.6 billion equals US$2.5 billion.
2006
• A smartcard system for RCs is implemented.
2007
• Beneficiaries total 11.5 million households or 38.3 million individuals (51.5% of the population).
2008
• Red RCs are canceled, and quotas and prices of subsidized items are unified among all beneficiaries.
• Children born after 1988 are added to the RC system (for the first time since 1988).
• Beneficiaries total 10.8 million households or 57.7 million individuals.
• Strikes and demonstrations occur in Mahal Kobra because of food price increases. 
2009
• A detailed list of the neediest categories eligible for RCs is presented, with a new threshold of LE 400 per month household income and a maximum of four beneficiaries per household.
• Changes in the categories of the neediest (first-care) groups eligible for RCs are mentioned in decree 31 for 2009, with an increase in the threshold to LE 750 for pensioners and LE 1,000 for government and public sector employees.
• Beneficiaries total 11.8 million households or 63.1 million individuals registered at 25,129 tamween groceries. • The price of sugar increases to LE 1.25 per kilogram starting on July 1.
• Regulations are set for dealing with the smartcard RCs.
• The regulations for dealing with smart RCs are revised.
• All tamween supply stores are to be open 6 days of the week, for 2 time periods, for a minimum of 5 hours each period.
• Beneficiaries total 12 million households or 63.4 million individuals, and 24,975 tamween groceries participate. • Changes in the eligibility criteria increase the maximum monthly income to LE 800 for informal workers, LE 1,200 for pensioners, and LE 1,500 for formal workers.
• The number of beneficiaries of RCs is limited to 4 people per household, with no addition afterwards, even in cases of death, traveling abroad, and so on.
• Beneficiaries total 15.8 million households or 64.7 million individuals. • The working hours of tamween groceries are reduced to 2 p.m.-10 p.m., 6 days a week.
• The decree relieves RC beneficiaries who voluntarily notify the state about the eligibility of some members registered on the RCs (because of death, travel longer than 6 months, or duplication) from paying the price differences, if they do this before december 31, 2013.
• Beneficiaries total 18.5 million households or 66.7 million individuals, and 24,003 groceries participate. 
2014
• Relieving RC beneficiaries who voluntarily notify the state about the eligibility of some members registered on the RCs (because of death, travel longer than 6 months, or duplication), and tamween groceries that notify about the accurate number of RCs registered with them, from paying the price differences, if they do this before June 30, 2014.
• All tamween groceries are to be open 6 days a week, 1 p.m.-11 p.m.
• A paradigm shift in the system replaces monthly quotas of a specific set of food items for a maximum number of 4 individuals per family with a monthly cash allotment of LE 15 per person and no limit on the number of beneficiaries per family, to buy any of a much larger set of items.
• A points-based reward system is established that uses smartcards and allows beneficiaries to use savings from BB consumption for buying commodities under the RC system, thus consolidating the RC and BB programs into one new system. Prime Minister decree 978 312 2015
• All children age 2 and older are added to the RCs of their households.
• Beneficiaries total 20.6 million households or 68.9 million Egyptians, and 25,684 tamween groceries participate. Note: A quantitative survey was undertaken in May 2016 on a random sample of 1,500 observations from geographically representative regions. The beneficiary survey was funded by the world Bank and conducted by Heba El-Laithy, consultant and professor at Cairo University, in collaboration with EgyPol.
ANNEX 3B. MAIN RESULTS OF THE BENEFICIARY SURVEY
a.
The questions were asked to assess the perceptions of beneficiaries about the new system compared to the old one.
b.
The quantity dimension reflects the adequacy of the system with respect to the size of benefit and quantity of commodities.
